This post is about situations that would “trigger” the adoption of the turn-taking institution. Good reforms sell themselves. They sell themselves not only on the basis of their beneficial long term consequences, but also on their capacity to solve immediate problems for decision-makers in the status quo.
While there are triggers conducive to reform in general (e.g. “crisis”), here I focus on two triggers that are particular to the transition into the turn-taking institution.
Trigger #1: A term-limited incumbent. A term-limited incumbent who is popular enough to win reelection but not popular enough to repeal term limits could form a supermajority coalition around at once (a) repealing term limits AND (b) adopting the turn-taking institution. The incumbent gets the chance to stay on in alternate years, the opposition gets greater assurance they will have their turn.
Consider U.S. cities. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, (i) there are roughly 20K cities; (ii) suppose all have mayors; (iii) roughly 10% or 2K have term limits; (iv) of these, suppose all are limited to eight years, and (v) that all elected mayors make it to the limit but would want to run again. That would mean roughly 2,000/8 = 250 triggers per year. Take 25 triggers per year as a more conservative estimate. High profile examples would include New York, Atlanta, and New Orleans.
Consider the U.S. states: (i) roughly 70% or 35 U.S. states have gubernatorial term limits; (ii) of these, suppose all are limited to eight years, and (iii) that all elected governors make it to the limit but would want to run again. That would mean roughly 35/8 = ~4 triggers per year. More conservatively, there might be one trigger every two or three years. High profile examples would include California, Florida, Virginia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, etc.
Internationally, (i) roughly 50 countries have presidential term limits, (ii) of these, suppose all are limited to ten years, and (iii) that all elected presidents make it to the limit but would want to run again. That would mean roughly 50/10 = ~5 triggers per year. High profile examples would include the U.S., Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Nigeria, Kenya, Afghanistan, and Iran.
Trigger #2: Top two candidates in dead heat or deadlock. Candidates from the top two opposing parties could form a supermajority reform coalition either (i) as *insurance* before a close election, or (ii) as a way of resolving a deadlock after an election.
In the run-up to a close election, the risk-averse on both sides may prefer a guarantee of half of the term rather than a 50-50 shot at winning all of the term. Unfortunately, partisans tend to be excessively optimistic about their chances of winning. If both sides feel almost certain they will win the whole term if there is no reform, then a guarantee of half of the term will not have the same appeal.
If the election is still too close to call after election day, there is relatively less scope for partisan optimism. Either side could win the recounts, and the side that does win still won’t have the same mandate or legitimacy that they would have had from a clear victory.
Consider U.S. cities again. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, (i) there are roughly 20K cities; (ii) suppose all have mayors; (iii) suppose the elections are, on average, four years apart; and (iv) roughly 1% of these are deadlocked up to and through election day. That would mean roughly (20,000/4)*.01 = 50 triggers per year.
And so on and so forth.
Recent deadlocks at the presidential level would include the U.S. (2000), Mexico (2006), Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), Iran (2009), etc.
THE BOTTOM LINE: Many reformers try to sell reforms entirely on the basis of their long term benefits. This is like trying to start a fire by setting the spark directly to the log, without tinder or kindling. A good reform (e.g. the turn-taking institution) solves immediate problems for decision-makers in the status quo. This is the trigger for the transition. Longer term benefits emerge as a by-product or bonus.
