1. This video is a thing of beauty.
2. I want Larry to make another video that addresses the problem upstream of this one. That is, why do people spend so much money (and time, attention, blood, sweat and tears) on politics? The simple answer is: “Because there is so much at stake.”
3. A wise man would ask: should we hack at the branches or strike at the root?
4. Striking at the root (i.e. lowering the stakes) often means restricting the scope of power. But many restrictions on the scope of power don’t work. Constitutions are not self-enforcing.
5. The trick is to find a simple, fair procedure that lowers the stakes and makes it easier to enforce broadly beneficial self-restraint.
June 27, 2010 at 8:34 pm
Compared to how much money the gov spends, we spend amazingly little on campaigns. We actually spend more on toothpaste.
July 1, 2010 at 1:07 pm
Hey Teageegeepea:
1. You are right that campaign spending in the U.S. is small relative to the amount of government spending. That fact goes by the name of Tullock’s Puzzle. If you don’t know about it already, check out the paper by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder: “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” More on that here (with comments on impact of Citizens United): http://tiny.cc/8zhry.
Quick thoughts on the Tullock Puzzle:
a. A lot of spending is not “up for grabs” as a result of who wins office.
b. Each elected actor — including the president — has limited influence in the policy-making process.
c. Taking either *too much* money or the *wrong* money can lead to net vote losses.
d. Many interest groups do not manage to overcome their collective action problems.
e. Most of the “bidding” to win is done by committing to policies attractive to potentially pivotal voters.
2. I think the problem of rent/privilege-seeking goes deeper than campaign spending. We the people are part of the problem (see 1e). Some relationships between voters and interest groups:
a. Interest groups have more influence when voters don’t care and/or disagree with one another. Voters care about important things, and agree about many important things (which therefore rarely come up). Thus, if policy-making were a 21-speed bicycle, then voters pick the big gear, and interest groups pick the small gear. If policy is a number between 0 and 100, then voters pick the 10s place, and interest groups pick the 1s place.
b. Political entrepreneurs figure out when to concentrate benefits and disperse the costs (i.e. taking $1 from every American to give $300M to an interest group), and when to create broad benefits from concentrated costs (i.e. taking $300M from a villain to give $1 to all). If they misplay their cards (and they often do), they open the door for the competition.
c. Effective interest groups figure out how to tap into mass preferences. Materially motivated “bootleggers” tap into morally motivated “Baptists.”
3. In my mind, the key is to:
a. Reduce or eliminate the stakes of electoral conflict for office-seekers AND citizens at large AND interest groups, so that all three have less motivation to seek privileges by buying/selling power in the run-up to elections.
b. Reduce or eliminate the stakes of policy conflict for office-seekers AND citizens at large AND interest groups, so that all three have less motivation to seek privileges by buying/selling power after the election.
I believe “3a” can be achieved with the “stroke of a pen”, and “3b” can be achieved with the “stroke of a pen” + time. (This is my most absurd belief.)
July 15, 2010 at 8:40 pm
TCD,
While money may explain why Representatives spend such a low proportion of their time legislating (and Senators a relatively higher, but still low proportion), and money may influence some legislation, do you think that to the extent that our Congresspersons respond to non-moneyed interests, e.g., grassroot populism, they do any better? In other words, is Larry right that the dependence on money is an evil (assuming such dependence)?
IB
October 11, 2010 at 8:25 am
[...] Larry Lessig on money in politics [...]