The Spirit of Moderation

Here’s Adam Ozinek:

The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee is running this extremely ugly and xenophobic ad against Pat Toomey, who is the Republican U.S. Senate candidate for Pennsylvania. The ad includes all the classic racist Orientalism touches, from gong sounds to fortune cookies.  The goal of the ad to slander Toomey with a quote of his where he says “It’s great that China is modernizing and growing”. Gasp! Oh the horror!

The economic growth and modernization in China over the last 30 years has lifted literally hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and if you don’t think that’s an unmitigated great thing then fuck you, I hope a Chinese person does “steal your job”.

I know campaign ads shouldn’t affect us. We should vote based on policies and expected welfare impacts of those policies. But at some level these political ads become pollution, a pure negative externality. And I can’t look past it when a party or politician is willing to spew pollution to get elected. If you’ve got to denigrate a whole nation of people and one of the greatest economic miracles of the last 50 years, and stir up a hornets nest of ugly xenophobia in order convince people you’re the man for the job, then you’re demonstrably not the man for the job.

On Friday, the New York Times featured an article on cross-partisan (bi-partisan?) couples: “Hand-holding across the aisle.” Here is a selection:

When Jeanne Safer met the historian and political journalist Richard Brookhiser, he disclosed straightaway that he wrote for National Review. Her initial reaction was, Uh-oh. “I thought of conservatives as the John Birch Society,” said Dr. Safer, a psychotherapist in New York City. “I’d heard of William F. Buckley but certainly never thought he’d be at my wedding.”

That wedding was 30 years ago. “His politics is of his essence, but not the fundamental part,” Dr. Safer said of her husband. “It’s his character, his emotions, his appreciation of me that are important. And he is coherent in his own way. He has legitimate reasons for all the repellent ideas he holds.” [TCD: my italics]

I especially liked the last line. As social psychologists Lee Ross and Andrew Ward note, conflicts are often amplified as a result of our “naive realism.”

The central tenet of naive realism is that “I see things as they are.” An implication is that “other well-informed, well-intentioned, reasonable people will see things the same way.” When we find we disagree with someone, we face an attribution problem. “Perhaps they are uninformed; they are unaware of the very good arguments that I know!” We share our arguments. They are unconvinced. Drat! We infer that they are stupid, evil, or greedy.

Whatever the intensity of conflict would have been between two sets of well-intentioned, reasonable people, it is now more intense, as it is between us well-intentioned, reasonable people and the coalition of the stupid, the evil and the greedy.

Cross-partisan marriages may put some speed bumps on the path to “inferring” the other side is stupid, evil or greedy.

My take: The key to ending polarization in this country is for all well-intentioned, reasonable people to start marrying across party lines.

HT: Tyler, who — like a cross-partisan marriage — puts speed bumps on the path to inferring that one or the other side is stupid, evil or greedy.

What happens if we put Herb Block in the ring with the quotable Joseph Schumpeter? You decide.

Here’s where Schumpeter ends up:

“[T]he typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests…”

Read the rest of this entry »

While I’ve been away, I’ve missed the chance to comment on some notable news in high-stakes electoral politics. Where to begin? Mosques in Manhattan! Stealth Muslim presidents! Koran-burning pastors! A Rove vs. Palin fight!

Speaking of fights, here’s a Herb Block political cartoon from the 1946 mid-term elections (hat tip: the Library of Congress). The big fellow, “the campaign,” is knocking the sense out of the scrawny fellow, “voter’s intelligence.” The play-by-play, which is the caption on the cartoon, is that: “He’s taking an awful beating.”

Here is the description offered by the LOC: “Herb Block believed that voters were the real losers in the 1946 off-year election in which Republicans accused Democrats of being Communists and the Democrats equated their Republican counterparts with Hitler. Voter discontent with rising food prices and shortages of such staples as meat and sugar, as well as the growing fear of the spread of communism from Europe, led to a Republican majority in both the House and the Senate.”

Sound at all familiar?

Unfortunately, it is a mistake to think that a low-quality discourse is foisted by politicians on an unwilling populace. If only it were so! The problem would practically fix itself! This “take” ignores the demand-side of the problem. The supply follows the demand. Politicians are barometers; they ain’t the weather. We get low-quality discourse because that is what voters respond to.

At first pass, this seems like a rather condescending position to take. But it’s not. More to come…

Posting has been light for the last couple months. The wife and I moved from New York (point A) to DC (point B) in early August, and it’s taken us some time to settle. But we are settled now. We now resume our regularly scheduled blogging!

If you like the good ideas of Steven Johnson, or the smart art of the folks at Cognitive Media, you might like this:

“We all know what to do, but we don’t know how to get re-elected once we have done it.”

– Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, 1995 – present

What refreshing candor! Hail Jean-Claude Juncker!

Juncker’s Dictum originally appeared in an article in The Economist in 2007: “The quest for prosperity” (March 15th). It is featured again in the most recent issue (July 10th-16th, 2010), not once (“Can anything perk up Europe?”) but twice (“Staring into the abyss”).

The claim in both articles is that impending fiscal crises make reform coalitions more viable than they are in normal times. I doubt Juncker would disagree. A modified variant of Juncker’s Dictum might go like this:

“We all know what to do, but we won’t get re-elected for doing it until it is hard to do it well, if at all.”

This reminds me of Jon Elster’s two paradoxes of constitution-making.*

First, when we have the capability to make effective constitutional changes (i.e. in normal, non-crisis times), we typically lack the desire. Second, when we have the desire to do so (i.e. in a crisis), we typically lack the capability. When we can, we do not want to; when we want to, we cannot.

My take: From a design perspective, the trick is to increase the desire to implement reforms in normal times. An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. The trick could be turned by giving voters and policy-makers immediate and on-going incentives to form, enforce and adapt mutually beneficial conventions, as they would have with the turn-taking institution.

* The two paradoxes are summarized in the conclusion of a 1995 article: “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,” Duke Law Journal 45: 364 – 396.

The Chair Not Taken from Zach Cohen on Vimeo.

…consider the alternatives.

I would happily pile on Will’s coinage, and include more figures that have influenced the way I understand the policy-making process. In addition to Rawls and Hayek, I would want to include James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, Doug North, Thomas Schelling, Russell Hardin, Jon Elster and Tyler Cowen. But that increase in truth too would come at too great a cost in beauty.

“Rawlsekananullockostromorthellinghardinelsterowenian” makes “Rawlsekian” look downright catchy.

This post builds on the previous post on liberaltarianism. Here I consider three paths from the status quo to a world of centrist liberaltarian policy-making.

A side note on terminology. Though in the previous post I used Brink’s portmanteau “liberaltarian” (that is, liberal + libertarian), here I am going to use Will’s term “Rawlsekian” (that is, Rawlsian + Hayekian). Both terms are esoteric (for now!), but Rawlsekian is more illuminating so long as our focus is on the policy-making process.

Here are the three paths I want to consider (see Figure 1):

Path #1: From Rawlsekian ideas through status quo policy-making institutions to Rawlsekian policies.

Path #2: From Rawlsekian ideas to Rawlsekian policy-making institutions to Rawlsekian policies.

Path #3: From non-Rawlsekian trigger conditions to Rawlsekian policy-making institutions to Rawlsekian policies.

Figure 1. Three paths from here to the Rawlsekian there.

To preview my conclusions:

Conjecture #1. The first path would not work because it is too hard to initiate and maintain Rawlsekian policies within status quo policy-making institutions. Step 1a is trivial — no institutional change is required — but step 1b is hard. Moreover, step 1b would have to be made (to “initiate”) and re-made on an on-going basis (to “maintain”).

Conjecture #2. If a Rawlsekian policy-making institution — e.g. a turn-taking institution — were adopted, Rawlsekian policies would follow. But Rawlsekian ideas would not lead a turn-taking institution to be adopted with status quo constitution-making forces as they are. Step 2a is hard, but step 2b is easy. If step 2a were taken, step 2b would take care of itself.

Conjecture #3. A Rawlsekian policy-making institution could be adopted as a result of non-Rawlsekian “triggers“, but then generate Rawlsekian policies as a bonus or by-product. The difficulty of step 3a is “moderate.” If step 3a were taken, step 3b would take care of itself.

Longer comments on each path.

On path #1. In this path, the big picture Rawlsekian vision is articulated by idea-entrepreneurs first. Opinion-leaders (academics, editorial writers, public intellectuals, policy wonks) find the vision compelling. Opinion-leaders influence both pivotal policy-makers and pivotal voters to some degree. Pivotal policy-makers and pivotal voters support more Rawlsekian policies. These policies deliver the goods. More policy-makers and voters see the light and the policies stick around for the long haul. The key point is that Rawlsekian policies are to be adopted and maintained within status quo policy-making institutions.

Challenges on path #1. There are three challenges to taking step #1b one time. And it would have be taken many, many times.

The first challenge is that — unfortunately — artfully chosen illiberal policies are often politically advantageous. Policy-makers can typically improve their chances of winning elections by delivering potentially pivotal participants *a little something extra,* even if it means off-loading costs on the non-pivotal (i.e. those in the other coalition, immigrants, foreigners, future generations, etc.).

The second challenge is voter ignorance, irrationality and impatience. In the political arena, citizens are relatively weakly motivated to rein in sloppy or myopic thinking. Problems are readily pinned on scapegoats (the opposition, the immigrants, the foreigners, the rich, the poor, etc.). Hopes are pinned on snake-oil solutions. The Dunning-Kruger effect runs amok. H. L. Mencken should have said: “For every difficult and complicated question there is an answer that is simple, easily understood, inspiring and wrong.” Or maybe  “…simple, easily understood, flattering and wrong.” Economic and political liberalism bring about positive social change in a way that is impersonal, diffuse, complex, slow and boring.

The third challenge is that elite partisans suffer from confirmation bias and groupthink. Professional opinion-makers and amateur activists who want to seem relevant must coordinate around helping the “better team” win office. The “better team” becomes “our team.” Our naive realism dictates that “we see the world as it is.” A corollary is that “reasonable, smart, good people will see things the same way.”  Upon discovering that someone sees things differently, we first suppose they are uninformed. So we try to inform them. If they find our information less than compelling, we *infer* that they are stupid, evil, greedy, crazy, etc. “Yikes!”, we think. This amplifies the importance of winning control by whatever means necessary.

On path #2: In this path, once again, the big picture Rawlsekian vision is articulated by idea-entrepreneurs, but with a focus on Rawlsekian policy-making institutions rather than policies. Opinion-leaders again find the vision compelling. Opinion-leaders influence both pivotal policy-makers and pivotal voters to some degree. Pivotal policy-makers and pivotal voters support more Rawlsekian policy-making institutions. Once they are chosen, they are hard to change, even if voters and policy-makers “forget” why they were chosen in the first place. These policy-making institutions pick policies that deliver the goods.

Challenges on path #2. The challenge on this path at “step a” is the same as the challenges on the first path at “step b.” It is hard get the Rawlsekian policy-making institutions adopted in the first place, but if they are, then the on-going choice of Rawlsekian policies is relatively easy.

On path #3. In this path, the ideas don’t have to drive the reform. The Rawlsekian policy-making institutions are adopted for non-consequentialist reasons, or at least reasons that have little to do with the Rawlsekian consequences. Decision-makers in the status quo implement Rawlsekian policy-making institutions for selfish, myopic reasons. Citizens at large support them because they have appealing procedural fairness properties. It’s a “bootlegger and baptist” coalition for good. Once they are chosen, policy-making institutions are hard to change, even if voters and policy-makers did not or do not appreciate the full benefits of choosing them. These Rawlsekian policy-making institutions pick policies that deliver the goods.

Challenges on path #3. The challenge at “step a” is to build a coalition of selfish term-limited incumbents, fairness-minded moderates, and those who — temporarily at least — expect to lose a winner-take-all election.

I need to do another post on why I think the turn-taking institution would lead to the choice of Rawlsekian policies, though this post and this post offer some preview of that…

I am a big fan of Brink Lindsey and Will Wilkinson and their proposed “liberaltarian” hybrid of modern and classical liberal policy visions. As I understand it, the aim is to articulate the big-picture common ground for liberals of all stripes (even the conservative stripe).

In the long term, this may lead to a centrist reform coalition coordinated on coupling a dynamic market economy AND a robust but affordable social safety net; on coupling a strong military AND strict rules of engagement; and on coupling more negative AND positive individual liberties in social policy.

But for now, the focus is on articulating the modern and classical liberal common ground.

In this post, I supply some background links. In my next post, I discuss one path from here to there, where “there” is “a centrist reform coalition initiating and sustaining policy.”

Some descriptions of the project:

1. Brink’s initial article on the idea, “Liberaltarianism“, originally published in The New Republic online December 4th, 2006.

2. Some of Will’s blog commentary on the idea: “Is Rawlsekianism the Future?“, December 2006;  “Liberaltarianism Back to the Future”, May 2008; and “Liberaltarian Reactions”, February 2009.

3. Brink’s review — “Another Culture War? No Thanks” — of the new Arthur Brooks book, The Battle: How the Fight between Free Enterprise and Big Government Will Shape America’s Future, published in the American Prospect last Friday, July 2nd, 2010.

Some criticisms of the project:

1. Libertarians don’t see compromise with liberals as advantageous. Most libertarians are focused on economic policy (where they align better with Republicans) than on social and foreign policy (where they align better with Democrats). This point is made by Bruce Bartlett in “Liberaltarians?” Forbes, May 28th, 2009; and by Jonah Goldberg in “Whither Liberaltarianism?” NRO, February 11th, 2009.

2. Liberals don’t see compromise with libertarians as advantageous. Liberals and libertarians could rally around their dislike of the Bush administration. But liberals didn’t need libertarians to win (and couldn’t count on them anyway), and so they prudently cater to their base. This point is made by Matt Welch in “The Liberaltarian Jackalope“, Reason, April 2009; and by Ed Kilgore in “It’s You, Not Me: Liberals and Libertarians Finally Break Up,” in The New Republic, February 12th, 2010.

3. Liberals and libertarians have no way to enforce mutually advantageous policy compromises. This is a point made by Brink himself. Here is Bryan Caplan’s account of that: “What I Told the Liberaltarians“, July 22nd, 2009.

Some responses to these criticisms:

The project is about articulating the liberal common ground, not about forming a short-run tactical alliance. Will Wilkinson: “Missing the Point of Liberaltarianism.” February 11th, 2009. Also: “The Hope and Horror of Liberaltarian Alignments.” February 16th, 2009. Also: “Could Liberaltarianism Matter?” April 8th, 2010. As I understand it, Brink and Will are working on a book-length treatment of the idea, which will include a refined proposal as well as a reply to critics. Look for it!

My take: Liberaltarians are crafting policy compromises that could be broadly advantageous if initiated and sustained, but we lack institutional means to do that. In my next post, I lay out why I think turn-taking institutions offer a potential pathway to quasi-liberaltarian outcomes…

This post is about situations that would “trigger” the adoption of the turn-taking institution. Good reforms sell themselves. They sell themselves not only on the basis of their beneficial long term consequences, but also on their capacity to solve immediate problems for decision-makers in the status quo.

While there are triggers conducive to reform in general (e.g. “crisis”), here I focus on two triggers that are particular to the transition into the turn-taking institution.

Trigger #1: A term-limited incumbent. A term-limited incumbent who is popular enough to win reelection but not popular enough to repeal term limits could form a supermajority coalition around at once (a) repealing term limits AND (b) adopting the turn-taking institution. The incumbent gets the chance to stay on in alternate years, the opposition gets greater assurance they will have their turn.

Consider U.S. cities. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, (i) there are roughly 20K cities; (ii) suppose all have mayors; (iii) roughly 10% or 2K have term limits; (iv) of these, suppose all are limited to eight years, and (v) that all elected mayors make it to the limit but would want to run again. That would mean roughly 2,000/8 = 250 triggers per year. Take 25 triggers per year as a more conservative estimate. High profile examples would include New York, Atlanta, and New Orleans.

Consider the U.S. states: (i) roughly 70% or 35 U.S. states have gubernatorial term limits; (ii) of these, suppose all are limited to eight years, and (iii) that all elected governors make it to the limit but would want to run again. That would mean roughly 35/8 = ~4 triggers per year. More conservatively, there might be one trigger every two or three years. High profile examples would include California, Florida, Virginia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, etc.

Internationally, (i) roughly 50 countries have presidential term limits, (ii) of these, suppose all are limited to ten years, and (iii) that all elected presidents make it to the limit but would want to run again. That would mean roughly 50/10 = ~5 triggers per year. High profile examples would include the U.S., Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Nigeria, Kenya, Afghanistan, and Iran.

Trigger #2: Top two candidates in dead heat or deadlock. Candidates from the top two opposing parties could form a supermajority reform coalition either (i) as *insurance* before a close election, or (ii) as a way of resolving a deadlock after an election.

In the run-up to a close election, the risk-averse on both sides may prefer a guarantee of half of the term rather than a 50-50 shot at winning all of the term. Unfortunately, partisans tend to be excessively optimistic about their chances of winning. If both sides feel almost certain they will win the whole term if there is no reform, then a guarantee of half of the term will not have the same appeal.

If the election is still too close to call after election day, there is relatively less scope for partisan optimism. Either side could win the recounts, and the side that does win still won’t have the same mandate or legitimacy that they would have had from a clear victory.

Consider U.S. cities again. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, (i) there are roughly 20K cities; (ii) suppose all have mayors; (iii) suppose the elections are, on average, four years apart; and (iv) roughly 1% of these are deadlocked up to and through election day. That would mean roughly (20,000/4)*.01 = 50 triggers per year.

And so on and so forth.

Recent deadlocks at the presidential level would include the U.S. (2000), Mexico (2006), Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), Iran (2009), etc.

THE BOTTOM LINE: Many reformers try to sell reforms entirely on the basis of their long term benefits. This is like trying to start a fire by setting the spark directly to the log, without tinder or kindling. A good reform (e.g. the turn-taking institution) solves immediate problems for decision-makers in the status quo. This is the trigger for the transition. Longer term benefits emerge as a by-product or bonus.

1. This video is a thing of beauty.

2. I want Larry to make another video that addresses the problem upstream of this one. That is, why do people spend so much money (and time, attention, blood, sweat and tears) on politics? The simple answer is: “Because there is so much at stake.”

3. A wise man would ask: should we hack at the branches or strike at the root?

4. Striking at the root (i.e. lowering the stakes) often means restricting the scope of power. But many restrictions on the scope of power don’t work. Constitutions are not self-enforcing.

5. The trick is to find a simple, fair procedure that lowers the stakes and makes it easier to enforce broadly beneficial self-restraint.

I am reading a very good book by Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: a History of American Hubris. Beinart offers an intriguing big picture account of U.S. foreign policy over the last 100 years. I hope to blog more about the book in the days to come.

For now, I want to share a thought about the myth that inspired the title of Beinart’s book: that of Daedalus and his son Icarus.

Quick review. King Minos hires the brilliant Daedalus to design the labyrinth that would house the Minotaur. Once the labyrinth is complete, the ungrateful Minos imprisons Daedalus and his son Icarus so as to keep Daedalus from sharing the secret of its design. To escape, Daedalus fashions two pairs of wings made of feathers, wax and wood. Daedalus warns Icarus not to fly too high (lest the sun melt the wax that holds the feathers to the wood), nor too low (lest the sea foam soak the feathers and weigh them down). The two successfully take flight. Icarus is overcome by the exhilaration of flight, and climbs higher and higher, ignoring his father’s counsel. Sure enough, the sun melts the wax that holds the feathers to the frame, and he plunges to his watery grave. Daedalus sadly flaps off to his freedom. The end.

The standard reading is that the hubris of Icarus led to his downfall. A different take would be that Daedalus drowned Icarus. Not intentionally, of course. Still, Daedalus is foolish for expecting Icarus to heed his counsel even as Icarus is foolish for ignoring his counsel. At least Apollo tried to dissuade his son Phaethon from taking the Chariot of the Sun for a spin.

My take: The moral of the story is not only that hubris is typically bad, but also that persuasion typically does little to dampen it. When it comes to making policy (foreign policy or otherwise), we should be thinking of ways of harvesting the hubris that inevitably sprouts up, rather than hoping to salt the ground by imploring people to be humble. Economists have thought a lot about harvesting self-interest, but only a little about harvesting self-love…

A majority of voters in California approved Proposition 14 this week. Prop 14 changes the way citizens elect the governor, the state legislators, the  U.S. senators and representatives.

The old way was to have partisan primaries and a general election open only to winners of a partisan primary and to independents. The new way is to have a single open primary, from which only the top two vote-getters advance to a general election run-off. The figure below (source here) displays the differences.

I find it encouraging that those who proposed and passed Prop 14 have traced California’s recent political problems back to the electoral process itself. This is a cut above “throwing the bums out.” We need to throw out the way we throw the bums out.

But the idea is to replace it with something better. Even with Prop 14, the stakes of winning the general election will remain high, and candidates will discover the best way to win is to appeal fiercely to their partisan base and activists, to special interests, and to swing voters. Prop 14 is a step in the right direction, but it is a very small step.

For all the sound and fury of its proponents and detractors, you wouldn’t know so. Jesse McKinley’s article on Prop 14 in the New York Times begins like this: “The time for tinkering is done. / That was the message Californians sent when they voted Tuesday to radically rejigger elections in the nation’s most populous state.”

My take: The time for tinkering is done, but the tinkering goes on anyway…

Coming soon: A post on why those who are “pro” and those who are “anti” Prop 14 over-perceive and over-state their differences.

I am very sympathetic to the points that many have made about the difficulty of reforming poorly governed cities, states, and countries from the inside. I made this graphic to summarize some of the impediments to reform:

Survival-oriented politicians (a la Anthony Downs, Donald Horowitz, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors, etc.) seek to appeal to roughly three groups: (i) special interests (a la Mancur Olson, Gordon Tullock, Anne Krueger, etc.), (ii) voters who are often ignorant and irrational (a la Anthony Downs, Geoff Brennan, Loren Lomasky, Bryan Caplan, etc.), and (iii) dogmatic and ideologically divided elites (a la Philip Converse, Jeff Friedman, etc.). Moreover they do so in a world where policies have complex, lagged, interdependent, diffuse consequences (a la F.A. Hayek, Robert Jervis, Jeff Friedman, etc.), and where there is no third party enforcer to make it easy to credibly commit to reform (a la Doug North, Barry Weingast, Russell Hardin, Jon Elster).

So initiating and sustaining reform from the inside is tricky.

As a result, I am very, very sympathetic to the ideas of Paul Romer, Patri Friedman, Lant Pritchett, and others who think the most important thing we can do to improve human well-being in the immediate future is to create low-cost “exit options” out of failing states and into better governed alternatives. There are important differences between each of them, but the common thread is the most important! All hail the exit option!

I will try to celebrate the different ways in which these thinkers propose we bulk up “exit options” in later posts…

Meanwhile, however, I STILL think there are under-appreciated ways to reform the Pyramid of Misrule…

Of course, even if there were a magic button on top of the Pyramid that — if pressed — would dissolve the Pyramid in favor of on-going good government happily ever after, there would still need to be a reason why survival-oriented politicians would want to press it in the first place. Even if reform were workable, would leaders be willing and able to choose it in the status quo? My answer is “yes, willing and yes, able.” More on this point to come…